social capital, quality of labor relations, trade unions, minimum wage
JEL:
J30,
J50,
K00
Abstract:
Can public policy interfere with culture, such as beliefs and norms of cooperation? We
investigate his question by evaluating the interactions between the State and the Civil
Society, focusing on the labor market. International data shows a negative correlation
between union density and the quality of labor relations on one hand, and state regulation of
the minimum wage on the other hand. To explain this relation, we develop a model of
learning of the quality of labor relations. State regulation crowds out the possibility for
workers to experiment negotiation and learn about the true cooperative nature of participants
in the labor market. This crowding out effect can give rise to multiple equilibria: a “good”
equilibrium characterized by strong beliefs in cooperation, leading to high union density and
low state regulation; and a “bad” equilibrium, characterized by distrustful labor relations, low
union density and strong state regulation of the minimum wage. We then use surveys on
social attitudes and unionization behavior to document the relation between minimum wage
legislation and the beliefs about the scope of cooperation in the labor market.